11/WAKU2-RELAY
- Status: stable
- Editor: Hanno Cornelius <hanno@status.im>
- Contributors:
- Oskar Thorén <oskarth@titanproxy.com>
- Sanaz Taheri <sanaz@status.im>
11/WAKU2-RELAY
specifies a Publish/Subscribe approach
to peer-to-peer messaging with a strong focus on privacy,
censorship-resistance, security and scalability.
Its current implementation is a minor extension of the
libp2p GossipSub protocol
and prescribes gossip-based dissemination.
As such the scope is limited to defining a separate
protocol id
for 11/WAKU2-RELAY
, establishing privacy and security requirements,
and defining how the underlying GossipSub is to be interpreted and
implemented within the Waku and cryptoeconomic domain.
11/WAKU2-RELAY
should not be confused with libp2p circuit relay.
Protocol identifier: /vac/waku/relay/2.0.0
Security Requirements
The 11/WAKU2-RELAY
protocol is designed to provide the following security properties
under a static Adversarial Model.
Note that data confidentiality, integrity, and
authenticity are currently considered out of scope for 11/WAKU2-RELAY
and
must be handled by higher layer protocols such as 14/WAKU2-MESSAGE
.
Publisher-Message Unlinkability: This property indicates that no adversarial entity can link a published
Message
to its publisher. This feature also implies the unlinkability of the publisher to its published topic ID as theMessage
embodies the topic IDs.Subscriber-Topic Unlinkability: This feature stands for the inability of any adversarial entity from linking a subscriber to its subscribed topic IDs.
Terminology
Personally identifiable information (PII) refers to any piece of data that can be used to uniquely identify a user. For example, the signature verification key, and the hash of one's static IP address are unique for each user and hence count as PII.
Adversarial Model
- Any entity running the
11/WAKU2-RELAY
protocol is considered an adversary. This includes publishers, subscribers, and all the peers' direct connections. Furthermore, we consider the adversary as a passive entity that attempts to collect information from others to conduct an attack but it does so without violating protocol definitions and instructions. For example, under the passive adversarial model, no malicious subscriber hides the messages it receives from other subscribers as it is against the description of11/WAKU2-RELAY
. However, a malicious subscriber may learn which topics are subscribed to by which peers. - The following are not considered as part of the adversarial model:
- An adversary with a global view of all the peers and their connections.
- An adversary that can eavesdrop on communication links between arbitrary pairs of peers (unless the adversary is one end of the communication). In other words, the communication channels are assumed to be secure.
Wire Specification
The PubSub interface specification
defines the protobuf RPC messages
exchanged between peers participating in a GossipSub network.
We republish these messages here for ease of reference and
define how 11/WAKU2-RELAY
uses and interprets each field.
Protobuf definitions
The PubSub RPC messages are specified using protocol buffers v2
syntax = "proto2";
message RPC {
repeated SubOpts subscriptions = 1;
repeated Message publish = 2;
message SubOpts {
optional bool subscribe = 1;
optional string topicid = 2;
}
message Message {
optional string from = 1;
optional bytes data = 2;
optional bytes seqno = 3;
repeated string topicIDs = 4;
optional bytes signature = 5;
optional bytes key = 6;
}
}
> NOTE:
The various control messages
defined for GossipSub are used as specified there.
> NOTE:
The TopicDescriptor
is not currently used by 11/WAKU2-RELAY
.
Message fields
The Message
protobuf defines the format in which content is relayed between peers.
11/WAKU2-RELAY
specifies the following usage requirements for each field:
The
from
field MUST NOT be used, following theStrictNoSign
signature policy.The
data
field MUST be filled out with aWakuMessage
. See14/WAKU2-MESSAGE
for more details.The
seqno
field MUST NOT be used, following theStrictNoSign
signature policy.The
topicIDs
field MUST contain the content-topics that a message is being published on.The
signature
field MUST NOT be used, following theStrictNoSign
signature policy.The
key
field MUST NOT be used, following theStrictNoSign
signature policy.
SubOpts fields
The SubOpts
protobuf defines the format
in which subscription options are relayed between peers.
A 11/WAKU2-RELAY
node MAY decide to subscribe or
unsubscribe from topics by sending updates using SubOpts
.
The following usage requirements apply:
The
subscribe
field MUST contain a boolean, wheretrue
indicates subscribe andfalse
indicates unsubscribe to a topic.The
topicid
field MUST contain the pubsub topic.
> Note: The topicid
refering to pubsub topic and
topicId
refering to content-topic are detailed in 23/WAKU2-TOPICS.
Signature Policy
The StrictNoSign
option
MUST be used, to ensure that messages are built without the signature
,
key
, from
and seqno
fields.
Note that this does not merely imply that these fields be empty, but
that they MUST be absent from the marshalled message.
Security Analysis
- Publisher-Message Unlinkability:
To address publisher-message unlinkability,
one should remove any PII from the published message.
As such,
11/WAKU2-RELAY
follows theStrictNoSign
policy as described in libp2p PubSub specs. As the result of theStrictNoSign
policy,Message
s should be built without thefrom
,signature
andkey
fields since each of these three fields individually counts as PII for the author of the message (one can link the creation of the message with libp2p peerId and thus indirectly with the IP address of the publisher). Note that removing identifiable information from messages cannot lead to perfect unlinkability. The direct connections of a publisher might be able to figure out whichMessage
s belong to that publisher by analyzing its traffic. The possibility of such inference may get higher when thedata
field is also not encrypted by the upper-level protocols.
- Subscriber-Topic Unlinkability:
To preserve subscriber-topic unlinkability,
it is recommended by
10/WAKU2
to use a single PubSub topic in the11/WAKU2-RELAY
protocol. This allows an immediate subscriber-topic unlinkability where subscribers are not re-identifiable from their subscribed topic IDs as the entire network is linked to the same topic ID. This level of unlinkability / anonymity is known as k-anonymity where k is proportional to the system size (number of participants of Waku relay protocol). However, note that11/WAKU2-RELAY
supports the use of more than one topic. In case that more than one topic id is utilized, preserving unlinkability is the responsibility of the upper-level protocols which MAY adopt partitioned topics technique to achieve K-anonymity for the subscribed peers.
Future work
- Economic spam resistance:
In the spam-protected
11/WAKU2-RELAY
protocol, no adversary can flood the system with spam messages (i.e., publishing a large number of messages in a short amount of time). Spam protection is partly provided by GossipSub v1.1 through scoring mechanism. At a high level, peers utilize a scoring function to locally score the behavior of their connections and remove peers with a low score.11/WAKU2-RELAY
aims at enabling an advanced spam protection mechanism with economic disincentives by utilizing Rate Limiting Nullifiers. In a nutshell, peers must conform to a certain message publishing rate per a system-defined epoch, otherwise, they get financially penalized for exceeding the rate. More details on this new technique can be found in17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY
.
- Providing Unlinkability, Integrity and Authenticity simultaneously:
Integrity and authenticity are typically addressed through digital signatures and
Message Authentication Code (MAC) schemes, however,
the usage of digital signatures (where each signature is bound to a particular peer)
contradicts with the unlinkability requirement
(messages signed under a certain signature key are verifiable by a verification key
that is bound to a particular publisher).
As such, integrity and authenticity are missing features in
11/WAKU2-RELAY
in the interest of unlinkability. In future work, advanced signature schemes like group signatures can be utilized to enable authenticity, integrity, and unlinkability simultaneously. In a group signature scheme, a member of a group can anonymously sign a message on behalf of the group as such the true signer is indistinguishable from other group members.
Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.